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1. Introduction  
Some years ago, one of the authors of this squib was working in a large organization with 
many layers of management. It often happened that a manager who usually performed certain 
functions was unavailable to do so, and those functions were performed by a so-called 
backup, who was authorized to perform them in the manager’s absence. It was common for a 
backup performing such a function to say a sentence like (1) to other employees, and those 
other employees might speak of the occasion using a sentence like (2): 
(1) I’m being Mary today. 
(2) Sue is being Mary today. 
In the kind of situation described, employees who were not performing these managerial 
functions accepted sentences like (1) and (2) and understood them to be communicating the 
propositions conveyed by (3): 
(3) Mary has authorized {me / Sue} to perform functions in her absence that she normally 
performs. 
Sentences (1) and (2) could be—and were—taken to be truthful. It was possible for them to 
be taken this way precisely because it was understood that they meant that Sue was acting in 
Mary’s stead. That is, it was understood that in sentences (1) and (2) the subject, informally 
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termed a backup, as indicated above, was functioning as what might be referred to 
legalistically as a proxy for the NP immediately following being. 
Sentences like (1) and (2) have the appearance of progressives. We will argue, 
however, that the interpretation of such sentences, where the subject is understood as a proxy 
for the NP immediately following being, does not follow from our understanding of the 
semantics of progressive utterances generally, such as that discussed in Dowty (1979) and 
much subsequent work (see Landman, 1992; Portner, 2011, and references cited there).  We 
will argue, in fact, that despite the presence of -ing in these sentences, -ing does not 
contribute to a progressive interpretation, and we will propose an alternative account that is 
not grounded in aspect. This account takes as its point of departure two types of sentences of 
the form NP1 BE being NP2, where NP2 is a proper name: (a) cases in which NP2 is formally 
distinct from NP1, and (b) cases in which NP2 is formally identical to NP1; we will suggest 
extensions of our analysis of these sentences to sentences with indefinite complement NPs, as 
well as APs.   
Section 2 has three subsections. In section 2.1 we look at sentences like (1) and (2) in 
more detail. Then in section 2.2 we examine another class of sentences that at first glance 
seem quite unlike sentences (1) and (2)—sentences like John is (just) being John—but which, 
we will argue, are understood in the same manner as they are. This section includes our 
proposed formal account of the two sentence types we are concentrating on, an account that 
reflects our position that we are dealing here with something other than true progressives, the 
occurrence of -ing notwithstanding. Our alternative account makes use not of progressive 
semantics but rather of a novel operator rho (ρ) in semantic representations, which narrows 
down the reference of the NPs occurring in these sentences but in a way that does not involve 
aspect. Our rho-based account has a critical pragmatic component, and section 2.3 looks at 
the pragmatic factors that are at work in speakers’ understanding of the sentences in sections 
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1 and 2. Section 3 takes a look at sentences like John is being a genius or John is being 
brilliant, in which the complement of BE being is an indefinite NP or an AP. Section 4 is a 
conclusion. 
2. Two kinds of NP complements of BE being  
This section includes our proposed formal account of the sentence types presented in the 
Introduction. 
2.1 Stand-in and role-playing sentences 
Sentences (1) and (2), on the reading that concerns us here, are understood as discussing 
proxies—generally known informally as backups—in the hierarchical organizations in which 
they are used. A critical property of these sentences is they must almost obligatorily involve a 
form of BE being; it is generally not enough for them to refer to situations that are temporary, 
as in (4) and (5), which were suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer. Our informants who 
have worked in bureaucracies are generally uncomfortable with these and prefer 
interpretations where the speaker, Sue, and Mary are playing parts in a play:1  
(4) I will be Mary today. 
(5) Sue should be Mary today. 
The near-complete restriction to BE being of what we will call stand-in sentences (because, 
as we will argue, the subject is understood as a stand-in for the NP following being) can be 
                                                 
*We would like to thank Andy Rogers and two anonymous CJL reviewers for comments that 
made this a better paper. All shortcomings are our own. 
1 It must also be understood that, contrary to another reviewer suggestion, in sentences like 
(1) and (2) Mary remains department manager; Sue is authorized for some limited time, such 
as a day, to perform some of her functions in her absence, but, crucially, she does not become 
manager. 
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understood using concepts from Montague (1973), “The Proper Treatment of Quantification 
in Ordinary English” (henceforth PTQ): we analyse the definite NP serving as the subject of 
the sentence, as well as the NP immediately following BE being—Mary in sentences (1) and 
(2)—as picking out sets of properties, which we can think of as those that make up Sue and 
Mary the people. Let us denote the property set for what we will call the fundamental Sue as 
λPP{^s}, and for the fundamental Mary as λPP{^m}; still following Montague (1973), we 
abbreviate these as s* and m* respectively. What we are calling the fundamental person in 
each case is basic, not standing in for any other person. Recall now the rho operator 
mentioned in section 1: rho applies to the interpretation of an NP immediately following BE 
being and picks out a subset of the properties making up the interpretation of the subject.2 As 
we will see shortly, the specific subset that is picked out in a given case is determined 
contextually.  
We now propose that the interpretation of a sentence like (2) includes (6), which we 
assume is in the scope of a time adjunct like today, as in (2) itself, or a time that is readily 
understood in the context of utterance: 
(6) = (s*, ρ(m*))  
(6) states that the property set of the subject (here Sue) is equal to a subset of the referent of 
the NP in predicate position (Mary). In the case of sentence (2), (6) gives us that Sue’s 
property set includes a subset of Mary’s property set, for example, a set containing the 
                                                 
2 Formally,  
ρ(λPP{x}) ⊆ (λQQ{x}), where x is a contextually determined variable of type <s, e>, the 
type of functions from reference points to individuals. 
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property of being responsible for approving sick leaves. The membership of this subset is 
determined contextually; we will return to the question of contextual determination shortly.3 
As we have mentioned, sentences like (1) and (2)—and also (4) and (5)—can be 
understood in a way that involves not proxies but rather roles that the subject is or will be 
playing. It is easiest to imagine this role-playing understanding in a situation where the 
speaker and Sue are members of the cast of a play, and where the subjects of these sentences 
are to perform roles in that play that are designated by the NPs that are the complements of 
BE being. This role-playing understanding of sentences like (1) and (2) is not limited to 
plays, however. Suppose that Mary has a habit of making guesses about what is happening on 
the fifth floor of the building housing her department. Suppose now that Sue makes a guess 
about what is happening on that floor. One could comment on this resemblance between 
Sue’s behaviour and Mary’s by uttering sentence (2), Sue is being Mary. This role-playing 
use to which the sentences under discussion here and in section 1 can be put argues against 
any analysis that would make this or the proxy understanding an integral part of their 
meaning. However, the multiplicity of ways in which sentences like (1) and (2) can be 
understood, in appropriate contexts, shows that they are more versatile than one might expect 
if they were simple expressions of extensional identity. 
2.2 Instantiation sentences and a formal analysis 
                                                 
3 One may ask if (6) is also in the scope of a progressive operator, such as Dowty’s 
(1979: 134) PROG. We believe that the evidence for the presence of a PROG operator in (1) 
and (2) is meagre. Note that alternatives to BE being sentences do not occur in the 
progressive: 
(i) I’m Mary’s backup today. 
(ii) Sue is Mary’s backup today. 
6 
 
Something similar to the interpretation of sentences (1) and (2) is in evidence in a sentence 
like (7): 
(7) Dick Nixon was (just) being Dick Nixon.4  
Imagine (7) uttered in the context of a report of Nixon saying “I am not a crook.” To see how 
(7) is perhaps surprisingly similar in meaning to sentence (2), consider how it differs from a 
sentence like (8), which is of course a tautology: 
(8) Dick Nixon was Dick Nixon. 
A tautology like (8) may imply that we all know what Nixon was like (, namely…). 
(Compare Boys will be boys.) But the interpretation of (7) is crucially different from that of 
sentence (8). The meaning we are discussing for a sentence like (7) does not depend on 
speakers’ engaging in cooperative behaviour in the way that a conversational implicature like 
that engendered by (8) does (see our discussion of Grice’s Cooperative Principle in section 
2.3 below). And unlike (8) with an associated conversational implicature, (7) does not require 
a tautological reading for its interpretation—and indeed it does not make use of one: sentence 
(7) is not a tautology in the first place.  
A rough paraphrase of (7) is that Nixon was displaying properties that helped give him 
his distinctive character. We might think of the token of Dick Nixon that functions as the 
subject of sentence (7) as referring to former U.S. president Richard Milhouse Nixon as he 
famously appeared on American television on November 17, 1973, and said, “I am not a 
                                                 
4 Haj Ross (p.c.) has brought to our attention the possibility of a sentence like (i): 
(i) Nixon was (just) being himself. 
Our judgments are unclear about whether (i) is or can be equivalent to (7). If the two 
sentences can indeed be interpreted as equivalent, this is of course a problem for any theory 
that requires anaphors and non-anaphors to be in complementary distribution. 
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crook.” This Nixon was an instantiation of the fundamental Nixon, just as, legalistically, Sue 
in sentence (2) is functioning as an instantiation of her manager Mary. One of the members of 
the property set of the fundamental Nixon was the property of appearing shifty. The stand-in 
Nixon—the denotation of the subject NP—shared this property with the fundamental Nixon, 
so that having a shifty appearance was a member both of the fundamental Nixon’s property 
set and of the contextually determined subset of that set.  
Using the notation we introduced in section 2.1, we propose (9) as the semantic 
representation of sentence (7): 
(9) = (ρ(n*), (n*)) 
To see how (9) works as it does, it will be helpful, first, to summarize the various linguistic 
and non-linguistic entities that we are dealing with. Such a summary is given in (10−14): 
(10) Richard Nixon, a U.S. president, who is (was) an individual 
(11) Richard Nixon, an English NP 
(12) n*, a PTQ-style translation of the English NP Nixon into PTQ’s Intensional Logic (IL), 
equivalent to λPP{^n} 
(13) ρ, a 1-place operator that takes an NP-type extension as input and returns another NP-
type extension as output, namely, a contextually determined subset of the set of 
properties denoted by the input (see fn. 2). In the case at hand, we have that ρ(n*) is a 
contextually determined subset of the set of properties denoted by n*. 
(14) =, a 2-place operator taking expressions of like syntactic categories as input and 
yielding an expression as output that denotes extensional identity of those two inputs. 
Before we get to what “= (ρ(n*), (n*))” means, we have to review the more general 
assumptions we are making about translations of English into IL and about their 
interpretations in a model. First, we assume that sentences are interpreted relative to the 
Cartesian coordinates (or other coordinate system) of sets of possible worlds, sets of times 
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(which we take to be intervals), set of speakers, set of places, and so on. This is the only place 
in our analysis where intervals come into play. Since we are making this assumption about 
reference points for all sentences, we can dispense with the particulars in specific cases, 
notably where intervals are concerned.  
Our second assumption is that the rho operator applies to expressions of IL, not to 
individuals or to any of the denotata of the English expressions we may be dealing with, nor 
to the results of applying formal operations to those denotata. Specifically, we assume that 
the denotation of “n*” is the set of Nixon’s properties, not Nixon himself: Nixon was a 
person, not a set. The denotation of “ρ(n*)” is a contextually determined subset of “(n*)” (at 
the time (the interval) at which the sentence is evaluated—or, rather, since this sentence is in 
the past tense, at a time preceding that time.) 
We are now ready to look at what “= (ρ(n*), (n*))” denotes. It has to denote the 
extensional identity, within the context of a given utterance, of Nixon’s property set and a 
contextually determined subset of his property set. This result is neither contradictory nor 
tautological. It is not contradictory, because the two sets n* and ρ(n*) are not mutually 
contradictory (recall that a set can be a subset of itself). It is not tautological, because the sets 
n* and ρ(n*) do not necessarily have the same members. It does not matter, in any of the 
foregoing, what properties the individual Nixon has, since we are dealing with operations 
performed on IL expressions, not on Nixon himself. Nor does anything special need to be 
said about an interval during which n* holds (or during which ρ(n*) holds), because those 
intervals will always be the intervals at which the sentences containing them are evaluated (or 
intervals preceding these, in the case of past-tense sentences like (7)). 
When we apply these considerations to our bureaucrats Sue and Mary, we see that our 
analysis does not say that Sue the individual has more or fewer properties than Mary the 
individual. If we are dealing with =((s*), ρ(m*)), we see that extensional identity is 
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predicated of Sue’s property set and a contextually determined subset of Mary’s properties. 
Now it happens that in the world of bureaucracies to which our squib in part pertains, one 
who is a backup for a manager remains a backup for that manager only during the time in 
which the manager serves as such. It would be wrong to say that either our analysis or a 
modification of it entails that Sue has properties now that Mary has in general. At the time of 
the evaluation of the sentence Sue has properties that Mary has in general, within the 
bureaucracy in which she is employed. As indicated earlier, an example of the kind of 
property that Sue would have under these circumstances might be that of being responsible 
for approving sick leaves. It would be rare indeed for Sue to be asked to be older or younger 
than Mary, these not being properties over which she has control, or to buy a car like the car 
that Mary drives: this is where context plays a crucial role. 
2.3 Contextual determination 
We have mentioned that the particular set of properties picked out by the rho operator is 
contextually determined. Not just any subset of Mary’s properties is relevant to the 
interpretation of sentence (2), and, analogously, not just any set of properties of the 
instantiation of Nixon is relevant to the interpretation of sentence (7). We are here making 
crucial use of the assumption that the speakers and listeners of these sentences are exploiting 
the Cooperative Principle (CP) introduced by Paul Grice (1975), according to which people 
make their contributions to joint interactions maximally cooperative. Such joint interactions 
include conversation (Grice 1975: 45, 48-49), and a special case of the CP is Grice’s Maxim 
of Relation, which includes (15): 
(15) Be relevant. 
The role played by (15) in the understanding of sentences (2) and (7) explains why a speaker 
encountering one of them who does not know their context of use cannot grasp their 
significance. 
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How might the CP be at work in the interpretation of sentences (16) and (17)? 
(16) Sue is being Mary today. (= (2)) 
(17) Dick Nixon was (just) being Dick Nixon. (= (7)) 
Our understanding of the membership of ρ(s*) as it pertains to Sue’s role as Mary’s backup 
in the context of a bureaucracy depends on numerous propositions conveyed by way of 
Grice’s Maxim of Relation, of which only two follow here:    
• Our knowledge that Mary is absent from the department of which she is the manager 
or has duties that will soon require her to be absent; and 
• Our knowledge that Sue is competent to handle the managerial functions that she is 
likely to be called upon to perform as Mary’s backup. 
Our understanding of Nixon’s denial that he was a crook—that is, our understanding of one 
member of ρ(n*)—depends at least on the following points, which again derive via Grice’s 
Maxim of Relation. Here, since we are not dealing with a situation that is an everyday 
occurrence, the relevant propositions may seem larger in number; we list three that stand out: 
• Our knowledge that Nixon had an untrustworthy demeanour; 
• Our knowledge that men working for Nixon had been caught in an undercover 
operation at the headquarters of the opposition Democratic party; and 
• Our knowledge of the discovery of an unexplained 18½ minute gap in a subpoenaed 
tape recording of a private conversation between Nixon and White House Chief of 
Staff H. R. Haldeman. 
3. Sentences with indefinite NPs and APs 
The sentences we have considered so far in this squib have involved definite NPs as the 
complements of BE being. Yet indefinite NPs readily occur in this context, as do APs: 
(18) John is being a genius! 
(19) John is being brilliant! 
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As with the definite NPs we have studied, these indefinite predicate modifiers hold for their 
subjects in limited contexts; we do not understand (18) and (19) as being equivalent to (20) 
and (21), respectively: 
(20) John is a genius! 
(21) John is brilliant! 
It would appear that we need our semantics for (18) and (19) to be like that in (6) and (9) 
inasmuch as these modifiers must denote subsets of the sets of properties denoted by the 
subjects. But (18) and (19) involve existential quantification; the semantics for these 
sentences cannot be as straightforward as that in (6) and (9), as the latter two differ from the 
former two in not containing any variables. 
We propose that the semantics for John is being a genius is as in (22), in which π is a 
variable ranging over properties and Π is a designated variable ranging over sets of 
properties. In (22), the predicate modifier is of the same type as an NP—a set of properties—
just as it is in (6) and (9): 
(22) ∃π∈Π(⊆ρ(Π), (j*))∧(=(π, genius))  or, unpacked, 
∃π∈Π(⊆ρ(Π), (λππ{^j}))∧(=(π, genius)) 
(22) states that there is some property π that is a member of a contextually relevant 
property set that is a subset of John's property set, and π is the property of being a genius. The 
interpretation of John is brilliant is exactly parallel, except that brilliant appears in place of 
genius. 
The formula in (22) does not ensure that John is a genius. This is precisely the contrast 
between (18) and (20), on the one hand, and between (19) and (21) on the other: in (18) – 
(19), the speaker asserts that John is acting in the way a genius would, without asserting at 
the same time that the property of being a genius is inherent to John. (22) thus derives the 
desired reading.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
In this squib, we have proposed novel analyses of sentences of the form NP1 BE being XP2, 
both sentences in which XP2 is a proper name and sentences in which XP2 is an indefinite 
description or an AP. We have argued that various instances of phrases immediately 
following BE being are not true progressives. The sentences we have studied have to do with 
NP reference that is restricted when compared with the reference of the same NPs in other 
contexts. Our conclusion is that these restrictions do not have to do with aspect; rather, we 
hope to have shown, they are restrictions on NP reference in which an NP refers to a subset 
of the set of properties that that NP denotes in other contexts. We have furthermore shown 
that this conclusion holds if NPs and APs immediately following BE being have NP-type 
meanings and if their interpretation involves quantification over properties rather than 
individuals. 
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